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Jones v. Mississippi and the Court's Quiet Burial of
the Miller trilogy
Cara H. Drinan*
INTRODUCTION

In addition to its status as the world's largest jailer,' the United States is an
extreme outlier in its juvenile justice and sentencing practices.' As recently as 2005,
the United States permitted juvenile execution, 3 and today the United States is the
only nation that allows children to be sentenced to life without parole. 4 In the last
fifteen years, in a series of cases known as the Miller trilogy, the Supreme Court had
been slowly chipping away at the nation's use of the most extreme juvenile
sentences-the death penalty and life without parole. 5 That process came to an
abrupt end this past term with the Court's decision in Jones v. Mississippi.6 While
not a surprise, the Jones decision was a blow to the juvenile justice community and
certainly to Brett Jones himself. Youth advocates have decried the Jones decision as
"barbaric," 7 "abhorrent," 8 and "ludicrous," 9 but, as I argue in this Essay, ultimately
Jones is a loss for the Court and its institutional reputation-perhaps more so than
the juvenile justice community. In the last two decades, juvenile advocates have
Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America.
Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The Global Context, PRISON
POLICY INITIATIVE (2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/globa/2018.html
[https://perma.cc/6N4C1

6WYGI.
2 See generally Cara H. Drinan, THE WAR ON KIDS: How AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE LOST
ITS WAY (2018).
s Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding capital punishment unconstitutional for
juvenile crimes).

4 Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview (March 24, 2021),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/GP7UP45V].
5
6
7

See infra Part 1.
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).
Mark Joseph Stem, Brett Kavanaugh's Opinion Restoring Juvenile Life Without Parole is

Dishonest and Barbaric, SLATE (April 22, 2021), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/04/brettkavanaugh-sonia-sotomayor-juvenile-life-without-parole.html [https://perma.cc/NW5W-3T5P].
8 Rory Fleming, The Supreme Court's Abhorrent Decision to Back Life-Without-Parole
for Kids, FILTER (April 23, 2021), https://filtermag.org/supreme-court-juvenile-life/
[https://perma.cc/KE33-87XZ].
9
John Pfaff, It Is Ludicrous for the Supreme Court to Say Children Are Irredeemable, THE
WAsH. POST (April 23, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/04/23/jonesmississippi-supreme-court-life-sentence/ [https://perma.cc/Q578-VA66].
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been very successful at educating the public about juveniles' diminished culpability
and enhanced capacity for rehabilitation-and at translating that education into
0
policy changes at the state level.1 There is reason to hope such changes will continue
notwithstanding the disappointing realities of Jones.
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I briefly describes the Miller trilogy,
the question presented in Jones, and the holding in Jones-at least as the majority
presents it. Part II analyzes the Jones decision, identifying the ways in which it is an
enormous break from precedent, woefully out of touch with the realities of criminal
justice, and cruel in its language of indifference. Part III turns to the question of how
juvenile advocates might proceed in the aftermath of Jones, mapping out a path for
sustained reform in legislative, judicial, and executive bodies. By way of conclusion,
I examine an avenue for challenging extreme juvenile sentences that the Court itself
raised in dicta and query the viability of this path.
I. THE MILLER TRILOGY AND THE JONESMINIMALIST NARRATIVE
Beginning in 2005, in a series of cases known as the Miller trilogy, the Supreme
Court began to limit the extent to which states could expose youth to the most
2
extreme sentences on the books." In Roper v. Simmons,' the Court relied upon the
science of adolescent development as well as penological theories to conclude that
3
the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of minors.' Roper's determination that

youth "cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders,"" set in
motion subsequent cases challenging extreme juvenile sentencing in America. In
2010, the Court held in Graham v. Floridathat the Eighth Amendment also forbids
the sentence of life without parole (LWOP) in juvenile cases where the defendant
5
was convicted of a non-homicide crime.' Once again, the Court leveraged the
science that determined children were both less culpable and more amenable to
rehabilitation to ban LWOP in this sub-set of juvenile cases.' 6 Only two years later,
in Miller v. Alabama," the Court examined the question whether LWOP was
permissible even in cases where a juvenile committed homicide. While many youth
advocates had hoped the Court would ban juvenile LWOP (JLWOP) outright, the
Miller Court held instead that JLWOP was permissible only after the sentencing
8
body had considered youth and "its hallmark features"' and only for the "rare

10 See infra Part III.
"

Drinan, supra note 2, at 84-91.

12 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
13

Id. at 569-74.

14

Id. at 569.

's

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

16

Id.at68-69.

17

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

18 Id. at 477.
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juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption."19
Finally, in Montgomery v. Louisiana,20 the Supreme Court determined that
Miller had announced a substantive rule, one that barred a kind of sentenceLWOP-for an entire class of defendants-"juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect
the transient immaturity of youth," namely, "the vast majority of juvenile
offenders." 21 Because of Miller's substantive nature, the Montgomery Court found
it to be retroactively applicable,22 thereby entitling some 2,000 individuals
nationwide to a second look at their JLWOP sentences. 23 The Court's case law in
this area, even if limited in its reach, 24 was significant for its methodology, its
reliance on the science of adolescent development, and its moral leadership.25
Still, the Miller trilogy introduced a number of thorny implementation
questions, and courts have been grappling with these issues for years now. Initially,
there was the question of who benefited from the Graham and Miller decisions. With
the retroactivity of those cases resolved in favor of youthful defendants, 26 lower
courts addressed whether the Miller line of cases contemplated de facto JLWOP
sentences and aggregated sentences that, for practical purposes, were equivalent to
JLWOP. 27 Other courts saw challenges to whether states were, in fact, providing
prisoners "a meaningful opportunity to obtain release." 28 And most recently, there
has been much debate around how, when, and whether a determination of
"irreparable corruption" can be made. 29 This particular debate about Miller's
implementation brought Brett Jones before the Supreme Court and its new
conservative majority in 2020.
19 Id. at 479-80.
21

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016).
Id. at 208-09 (internal citations omitted).

22

Id. at 212.

23

Matt Ford, A Retroactive Break for Juvenile Offenders, THE ATLANTIC (Jan.
26, 2016),

20

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/montgomery-alabama-supreme-court/426897/
[https://perma.cc/3JPR-Y5N7].
24 The Miller trilogy addressed only JLWOP and capital punishment, leaving youth in America
still subject to transfer to adult court, mandatory minimums drafted with adults in mind, extreme termof-year sentences, and too often life-threatening conditions of confinement.

See generally Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IowA L. REV. 1787, 1799-1803
(2016); Cara H. Drinan, THE WAR ON KIDS 84-96; 132-53 (2018).
26 See, e.g., In re Moss, 703 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding
Graham retroactive); see also,
e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (holding Miller retroactive).
25

27 See, e.g., People v. Caballero 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012) (striking down 110-year sentence as
unconstitutional per Graham); see also, e.g., Vasquez v Comm., 291 Va. 232 (Va. 2016) (holding that
Graham does not apply to multiple term-of-year sentences that exceed defendant's life expectancy).
28 See, e.g., Sanders v. Eckstein, 981 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 2020) (upholding
state court ruling that
parole opportunity at age 51 satisfied defendant's right to meaningful opportunity for release).
29 See, e.g., Mathena v. Malvo, 893 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding JLWOP sentence
unconstitutional for failure to include permanent incorrigibility determination) (mooted by Virginia

legislative elimination of JLWOP).
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In 2004, when Mr. Jones was barely fifteen years old, he killed his grandfather
during a heated argument. 30 Jones was convicted of murder, a conviction that, at the
31
time, triggered a mandatory sentence of life without parole in Mississippi. Years
later when Mr. Jones was seeking post-conviction relief in the state court system,
the United States Supreme Court decided Miller. The Mississippi Supreme Court
determined that the Miller decision applied retroactively and ordered a new
32
sentencing hearing in Mr. Jones's case.
At that resentencing hearing, counsel for Mr. Jones argued that the Millerruling
rendered JLWOP permissible only in the rare case of a youth of "irreparable
33
corruption" and that there was no evidence to support that finding in his case. To
the contrary, Brett Jones had already proven himself to be capable of rehabilitation
during his years of incarceration. 34 The state court judge acknowledged that he had
the discretion to impose a sentence other than LWOP, but nonetheless determined
35
that LWOP remained the appropriate sentence for Brett Jones. Jones appealed that
ruling. He argued, under Miller and Montgomery, that the sentencing judge needed
to make a factual finding that he was "permanently incorrigible" before the judge
36
could lawfully re-impose the LWOP sentence.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jones v. Mississippi. The
question presented was "[w]hether the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencing
authority to make a finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before
37
imposing a sentence of life without parole." Jones made two arguments in favor of
such a requirement. 38 First, Jones argued that Miller and Montgomery rendered a
kind of sentence-LWOP-unconstitutional for a class of defendants-those minors
whose crimes reflect transient immaturity rather than permanent incorrigibility."
Further, Jones argued that, as in all cases where the Court has barred a kind of
punishment for a set of defendants, the sentencing body must have some process for
determining whether or not the defendant is part of that subset of defendants.4 0 Thus,
Miller and Montgomery must necessarily require lower courts to engage in the
permanent incorrigibility inquiry. 41 Without this factual determination, how else
30 Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1338 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Jones had
turned fifteen 23 days before his crime.
31 Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1309.
32
33

Id.
Id. at 1313.

Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1339 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
35 Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1309.
34

36

Id.

3

Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021), Brief for Petitioner at i.
Id.

38

40

Id. at 1315.
Id.

41

Id. at 1313.

39
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would courts satisfy the Eighth Amendment stricture that barred JLWOP for youth
whose crimes reflect transient immaturity? Finally, Jones advanced evidence that he
was not incorrigible-that he had, in fact, already embarked on a path of significant
rehabilitation.4 2 At a minimum, he asked the Court to remand his case and require
the Mississippi courts to make its own factual finding regarding his corrigibility.4 3
Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the majority, rejected the pleas of Mr. Jones
largely with the repeated incantation of two clauses from Montgomery. Disregarding
the language, logic and science of the Miller trilogy,44 the majority insisted that "[i]n.
a case involving an individual who was under 18 when he or she committed a
homicide, a State's discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally
necessary and constitutionally sufficient."" According to Justice Kavanaugh, a
sentencing judge must have the discretion to impose something other than LWOP in
juvenile homicide cases, and so long as the judge has that discretion, the Eighth
Amendment is satisfied. That judge does not need to make a specific factual finding
that the youth in question is one of the "rare" juveniles whose crime reflects
"permanent incorrigibility," 46 nor does that judge even need to make an implicit
finding to that effect. 47 This is evident, according to the majority, because there are
two clauses in Montgomery v. Louisiana which state that "Miller did not impose a
formal factfmding requirement" and that "a finding of fact regarding a child's
incorrigibility ... is not required."4 8 In fact, reading the Jones majority, one might
conclude that there was really nothing more to Montgomery-let alone its predecessor
cases-than these statements because Justice Kavanaugh cites them no fewer than
eleven times in the Court's opinion.

42

Id.

43

Id.

See infra Part IIA.
41 Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1309 (2021).
46 Id. at 1317.
44

47

I.a

39

Id. at 1317-18. The Court's repeated recitation of these two statements, which themselves
are edited, disregards the context in which they were made by the Montgomery majority. The actual
statements in Montgomery read as follows: "Louisiana suggests that Miller cannot have made a
constitutional distinction between children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those whose
crimes reflect irreparable corruption because Miller did not require trial courts to make a finding of
fact regarding a child's incorrigibility. That this finding is not required, however, speaks only to the
degree of procedure Miller mandated in order to implement its substantive guarantee. When a new
substantive rule of constitutional law is established, this Court is careful to limit the scope of any
attendant procedural requirement to avoid intruding more than necessary upon the States' sovereign
administration of their criminal justice systems . . . . Fidelity to this important principle of federalism,
however, should not be construed to demean the substantive character of the federal right at issue.
That Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement does not leave States free to sentence a
child whose crime reflects transient immaturity
to life without parole. To the
contrary, Miller established that this punishment is disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment."
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 211 (2016).
48
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According to the Jones majority, its decision "carefully follows both Miller and
Montgomery," 49 and its conclusion reflects nothing more than an application of the
Court's prior "explicit language addressing the precise question [in Jones] and
definitively rejecting any requirement of a finding of permanent incorrigibility.""
Never mind that Miller imposed a new substantive rule, and that Montgomery
recognized that states are not "free to sentence a child whose crime reflects transient
immaturity to life without parole" because in such cases that "punishment is
51
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment." Never mind that without some
factual finding on this count there is no meaningful way to draw this constitutionallyrequired line between transient immaturity and irreparable corruption. Never mind
that in Brett Jones's case the sentencing judge appeared to engage in perfunctory
52
consideration of his youth at best. The Jones majority would have its readers
believe that its hands were tied and that its conclusion was foregone under a faithful
reading and application of Miller and Montgomery.
As I explain in Part II of this Essay, nothing could be farther from the truth.
II. THE REALITY OF JONES
Despite its claims of modest, faithful precedent application, the Jones majority
upset sixteen years of caselaw in the juvenile sentencing arena. Moreover, Justice
Kavanaugh's opinion reflects a fundamental disregard for the ways in which our
criminal justice system is broken and a callous indifference to the individuals who
suffer at the hands of that system. I address each of these criticisms in turn below.
A. A Quiet Burialof the Miller Trilogy
The Jones majority eviscerated the Miller trilogy while pretending not to. And
perhaps the best evidence of this fact is that both Justice Sotomayor in dissent and
Justice Thomas in concurrence blast the majority for its disavowal of the Miller
trilogy and its intellectual dishonesty. First, as the dissenting justices explain, the
majority fundamentally misrepresents Miller and Montgomery. For example, the
majority describes Miller as a decision that merely banned mandatory JLWOP,
while choosing to disregard the substantive proportionality principle of Miller which
53
drew on the categorical bans in Roper and Graham. Further, the majority cabins
Roper and Graham to stand for the simple proposition that "youth matters in
sentencing," which is quite distinct from the actual proposition of those cases-that

Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1321 (2021).
so Id. at 1332.
51 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 211.
52 Jones, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021); see also Brief for Petitioner at i.
" Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1333 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
49
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youth precludes certain sentences for certain minors.54 Finally, as Justice Sotomayor
points out, the majority "twists precedent even further. . . by distorting Miller in a
way that cannot be reconciled with Montgomery's holding that Miller applies
retroactively under the Teague doctrine." 55 That is, the Court presents Miller as if it
were a decision that required merely a certain sentencing procedure (namely a
discretionary one), even while insisting that it has not overruled Montgomery, a
decision that held Miller to be substantive in nature. 56 These two positions cannot
coexist. And, as the dissenting justices rightly note, the Court itself sees this paradox
and even anticipates that lower courts will see it, as well. How should lower courts
digest this paradox? The Court suggests in a footnote that in future retroactivity
cases, courts should look to Supreme Court precedent before and after Montgomery,
but not to Montgomery itself. 57 Simply put, "[i]nstead of "disturb[ing]"
Montgomery's retroactivity holding... the Court attempts to bury it."5 8
It is no surprise that Justice Thomas concurs in the Court's judgement that
sentencing bodies need not find "a minor be permanently incorrigible as a
prerequisite to a sentence of life without parole." 59 Indeed, Justice Thomas considers
the entire Miller trilogy to be case law "that refashions the Eighth Amendment to
accommodate this Court's views of juvenile justice" 60 and would alternatively peg
the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment to what that term
meant in 1789.61 What is noteworthy about Thomas's concurring opinion is its
extensive overlap with the dissent and its sharp criticism of the majority. As Justice
Thomas explains, "in reaching [its] result, the majority adopts a strained reading of
Montgomery... instead of outright admitting that it is irreconcilable with Miller...
and the Constitution." 62 As Justice Thomas sees it, in the wake of Montgomery, the
Court had only two options: either it could apply Montgomery and hold that the
lawfulness of Jones's sentence hinged on a finding of his incorrigibility or it could
recognize thatMontgomery was mistaken and overrule it. 63 But, as Thomas explains,

9

Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1314.
5s Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1334 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 1335. ("In other words, the Court rewrites
Miller into a procedural rule and,
paradoxically, maintains that Miller was nevertheless 'substantive for retroactivity purposes."'); see

also supra PART I (discussing substantive nature of Miller rule).
57

Id. at

1336 n.4.

Id. at 1336.
59 Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1323 (2021) (Thomas,
60 Id. at 1324
58

J., concurring).

61 Id. at 1327. ("When the Eighth Amendment was enacted, juveniles even younger than Jones
could be tried as adults, and mandatory death sentences were available.: . . It is therefore implausible
that a [15]-year-old's . . . prison sentence-of any length, with or without parole-would have been
viewed as cruel and unusual.") (citations omitted).
62 Id. at 1323.
63

Id. at 1327.
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"The majority.. . selects a third way: Overrule Montgomery in substance but not in
name." 64
Despite the Court's insistence that its opinion represents just a "good-faith
65
disagreement with the dissent over how to interpret Miller and Montgomery," the
Jones majority represents a denial of the precedent and logic that animated the Miller
trilogy. Because of the Court's refusal to treat Miller as the substantive bar on
sentencing that Montgomery held it to be, judges going forward will be tempted to
engage in the same perfunctory consideration of youth that Mr. Jones received at
sentencing. Further, because the Court has now held that this kind of superficial
treatment of youth satisfies the Eighth Amendment, the Court has insulated those
decisions from future review. While the Court insists that it has left intact the
"differentness" of youth for sentencing purposes, it has, in fact, gutted what that
difference means in practice. Both in its refusal to follow the substantive rule of
Miller and in its denial of what it has done, the Court undermined its own credibility.
This is the first and most disappointing reality of Jones.
B. Disregardfor the Realities ofAmerican CriminalJustice
66
In addition to the Court's disregard for stare decisis, the Jones majority
opinion reflects either ignorance about the broken nature of the American criminal
justice system or blunt refusal to account for it. To begin, in rejecting Jones's
alternative argument that sentencing bodies should at least be required to explain an
implicit finding of incorrigibility, the Court relies on the deeply flawed assumption
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been operationalized at the state level.
In essence, the Court asserts: if a sentencing body has discretion to consider youth,
67
"the sentencer necessarily will consider the defendant's youth," because defense
counsel will argue the issue. This assertion is aspirational at best.
Representation of a minor facing LWOP is tantamount to capital
representation, 68 and effective advocacy in that context requires more than
69
"advanc[ing] an argument based on the defendant's youth." But the majority

6 Id at 1326-27. See also id. at 1328. ("But though the Court purports to leave Montgomery's
holding intact, it recognizes that Montgomery's analysis is untenable and not to be repeated. It would
be simpler to reject Montgomery in both name and substance.").
65

Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1321 (2021).

6

Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1336 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("How low this

Court's respect for stare decisis has sunk.").

Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1319.
Cf Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69-70 (discussing ways in which LWOP shares
characteristics of death penalty especially as applied to youth). See also Heather Renwick, et al., Trial
Defense Guidelines: Representing a Child Facinga Possible Life Sentence, CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR
SENTENCING OF YOUTH (2015) (setting out standards of representation many of which track ABA
67
68

guidelines for capital representation), https://cfsy.org/wp-content/uploads/Trial-Defense-Guidelines-

Representing-a-Child-Client-Facing-a-Possible-Life-Sentence.pdf [https://perma.cc/D479-J25N].
69 Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1319.
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proceeds as if the Court had not already held that "youth is more than a chronological
fact"7 0 when it refers to defense counsel "mak[ing] the sentencer aware of the
defendant's youth.""1 A lawyer representing a client like Brett Jones needs to gather
enormous amounts of factual, familial, educational, and psychological evidence;
leverage the expertise of mitigation and other specialists; and paint a picture for the
sentencing body of the ways in which youth and its mitigating attributes counsel
against the harshest sentence available under law. 72 The Court seems to be
completely unaware of the challenges inherent in representing a juvenile facing an
extreme sentence and the expertise needed to do that well.
Moreover, the Court fails to acknowledge that the gap between what effective
juvenile representation should look like and what it actually looks like is vast-just
as vast as the gap between capital representation standards and realities. 73 Since
1963, when the Supreme Court held that poor people accused of a crime have the
right to state-funded counsel, 74 that right has never been realized at the state level. 75
The same is true of the Court's similar ruling regarding the right to counsel for
children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 76 Despite a mountain of social science
evidence and systemic litigation challenging these unmet rights to counsel, the fact
remains that poor people accused of a crime often go without zealous representation
or (more often) enter a plea because their public defender is too overwhelmed to
investigate and litigate their case.
And to the extent that the Court was thinking that some defendants suffer from
Gideon 's unmet promise, but not the Brett Jones of the world, again, the Court would
be wrong. Eighty percent of people accused of a crime are poor.77 So right out of the
gates, the super-majority of criminal defendants will need to rely upon the efficacy
70

71
72

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).
Jones, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1319 n. 6.
See generally Heather Renwick, et al., Trial Defense Guidelines: Representing a Child

Facing a Possible Life Sentence, CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH (2015),
https://cfsy.org/wp-content/uploads/Trial-Defense-Guidelines-Representing-a-Child-Client-Facing-aPossible-Life-Sentence.pdf [https://perma.cc/D479-J25N].
73 See, e.g., Am. Civil Lib. Union, Slamming the Courthouse Doors: Denial ofAccess to Justice
and Remedy in America, 7 (2010) ("While capital cases are among the most complex, time-intensive
and financially draining cases to try, indigent capital defendants often are appointed attorneys who are
overworked, underpaid, lacking critical resources, incompetent, or inexperienced in trying death
penalty
cases."),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assetslRP_UPRsubmission annex.pdf

[https://perma.cc/Z8F6-BA8Z].
74 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
75 See generally NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE
DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009),

https://archive.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf [https://perma.cc/F76B-YX6].
76 Cara H. Drinan, Conversations on the Warren Court's Impact on Criminal
Justice: In Re
Gault at 50, 49 STETSON L. REV. 433 (2020).
?? Mary Sue Backus and Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J., 1031, 1034 (2006).
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of their lawyer to "advance an argument" about youth or any other mitigating
circumstance that may determine whether or not that defendant dies in prison.
Moreover, the particular sub-set of criminal defendants who are within the purview
of the Miller trilogy are an extremely vulnerable and already marginalized group of
individuals. Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent that "[n]on-whites are
overrepresented among the JLWOP population in ways perhaps unseen in any other
8
aspect of our criminal justice system," and that racial disparity is only growing.79
At the same time, just like Brett Jones, children serving JLWOP have tremendous
trauma histories: seventy-nine percent of youth sentenced to LWOP witnessed
80
regular violence in the home and nearly half were physically abused. Youth facing
LWOP have had "limited 'contro[l] over their own environment' and lack the ability
to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings." 81 In sum, poor,
minority and otherwise vulnerable youth are the individuals directly impacted by the
Jones decision, and yet the Jones majority blithely proceeds as if the fragile Sixth
Amendment right to counsel will safeguard this group of defendants from the
Court's own ruling.
The majority's assumption about the availability and efficacy of defense
counsel for youth facing LWOP is only the first in a series of baseless assumptions.
To the extent that the Court even recognizes that not all defense counsel will be
equipped to zealously advocate for a client like Brett Jones, the Court offers an
82
equally hollow fallback: ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Once again, the
Court glosses over reality: that trial counsel's deficient performance often includes
the failure to create a viable record for appellate purposes; that there is no federal
right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings; and that the Strickland test for
83
inefficacy itself is insurmountable for all but a few exceptional defendants.

78 Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1334 n. 2 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("The harm from
these sentences will not fall equally.").
79

Id.

80

Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life

Without Parole: An

Overview (March

https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/

24, 2021),

[https://perma.cc/6253-

AQ451.
81

82

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471.
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1319 n. 6 ("If defense counsel fails to make the

sentencer aware of the defendant's youth, it is theoretically conceivable (albeit still exceedingly
unlikely in the real world) that the sentencer might somehow not be aware of the defendant's youth.

But in that highly unlikely scenario, the defendant may have a potential ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim.").
3 Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CoRNELL L. REv. 679 (2007).
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The Court also seems to place a naive amount of faith in the decision-making
process of state court judges. In rejecting Jones's request for a sentencing
explanation, the Court asserts that an "explanation is not necessary," because "a
sentencer cannot avoid considering the defendant's youth if the sentencer has
discretion to consider that mitigating factor." 84 The Court appears only to
contemplate an outlier scenario in which a judge refuses as a matter of law to
recognize the import of a defendant's youth. 85 The more commonplace and real
concern is that eighty-seven percent of state court judges are elected and feel
pressure to yield to local sentiments, often retributive in nature, rather than to follow
the science of adolescent development. 86
Finally, the Jones Court concludes with a message to Brett Jones that once
again reveals its disconnect from criminal justice matters on the ground. After
declaring that its decision is "far from the last word on whether Jones will receive
relief from his sentence," 87 the Court notes the evidence of his rehabilitation and
urges Mr. Jones to marshal that evidence in other forums: specifically, the
Mississippi state legislature, its courts, or its Governor.88 This suggestion fails to
account for the fact that Mississippi courts had already been flouting the demands
of the Miller trilogy prior to Jones,89 and that Mississippi lawmakers have rejected
not only the national sentencing trend away from JLWOP, but also basic efforts to
reform its prisons without the threat of federal oversight. 90 Mississippi is one of only
twelve states in which the Governor has the sole authority to grant clemency.91 In
2012 then-Governor, Phil Bryant, promised never to exercise his clemency power
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Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1319-20.
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Id. at

1320 n.

7.

86 See, e.g. Kate Berry, How JudicialElections Impact CriminalCases, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE,
(2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201908/ReportHow_Judicial_ElectionsImpact_CriminalCases.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9TR-UWSF].
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Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1323.
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See Brief of Amici Curiae, Nat'l Assoc. Crim. Def. Lawyers, Miss. Office of the State Public

Defender, and Miss. Public Defenders Assoc., Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259, 6-18 (Jun. 12, 2020),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/ 8/18-1259/145474/20200612115114829_ 18-

1259tsacNACDL.pdf

[https://perma.cc/J2VX-LEJX].

90 Shirley L. Smith, Mississippi 'Throws Away' Juveniles, Robbing Them of Chance for
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Miss.
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Nov.
2,
2020,
https://www.mississippicir.org/news/some-mississippi-courts-under-fire-for-dismissing-juvenilelifers-potential-for-rehabilitation-8tsng [https://perma.cc/KS9J-KTN8] (citing trend away from
JLWOP and state's rejection of that trend); see also Scott Colom, GrantingClemency One Solution to
Mississippi
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Crisis,
JACKSON
FREE
PRESS,
Jan.
29,
2020,
https://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2020/jan/29/opinion-granting-clemency-one-solutionmississippi/ [https://perma.cc/3UWY-TP9X] (discussing state's" history of federal oversight of its
prisons).
91 Clemency Process by State, Death Penalty Inf. Ctr., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-andresearch/clemency/clemency-by-state [https://perma.cc/DFD7-X3QJ].
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and floated the idea of legislative changes that would make clemency grants harder
for future governors.9 2 Mississippi's current governor oversaw inhumane conditions
and brutal violence in the state's prison system while serving as lieutenant governor,
and last year he vetoed a bipartisan bill that would have made more prisoners eligible
94
for parole. 93 Mississippi has one of the highest incarceration rates in the world, and
its judges, lawmakers and executive actors are responsible for that fact. Having
refused Mr. Jones even a new sentencing hearing that would comport with the Miller
trilogy, the Court's suggestion that he seek relief again from Mississippi state actors
rings hollow.
In short, the majority decision in Jones rests on several fantasies about how our
criminal justice system might operate in its ideal form. To be fair, the Court is not
responsible for underfunded public defense systems that regularly violate the
constitutional rights of their clients; it is not to be blamed for elected state judges
who appease a public appetite for vengeance; and it is not the institution from which
to seek clemency reform. But the Court does have an obligation to anchor itself in
the realities of the American criminal justice system when rendering life and death
decisions for those within it.
C. Language of Cruel Indifference
The last disappointing reality of Jones lies in the language of Justice
Kavanaugh's opinion. In stark contrast to the tone of the Miller trilogy, the Jones
opinion reflects cruel indifference to those within its purview-both in what it says
and in what it leaves unsaid.
95
Justice Kennedy was the driving force behind the Miller trilogy, and there is
no vestige of his voice in the Jones opinion. Writing for the Court in Roper, Kennedy
discussed the critical differences between adults and juveniles, and concluded that,
because of those differences, "juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified
among the worst offenders." 96 At bottom, Kennedy, was betting on kids. And that
97
bet was sound, based on decades of social and medical science. Further, Justice
9
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Prison System, Miss. TODAY (Jan. 15, 2020), https://mississippitoday.org/2020/01/15/amid-festeringcrisis-reeves-confronted-with-embattled-and-leaderless-prison-system/

[https://perma.cc/8LQV-

FYPZ].
93

Life

Id.; see also Emily Wagster Pettus, Mississippi Governor: No Planfor Pardon in Woman's
2020),
1,
(Sept.
LEDGER
CLARION
Pot,
for
Sentence
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https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/MS.html [https://perma.cc/FN99-TFRA].
9s Justice Kennedy authored two of the trilogy cases (Roper and Graham), as well as the case
making Miller retroactive (Montgomery).
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Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
See Part I supra.
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Kennedy appreciated the cruelty of the LWOP sentence as applied to youth: "By
denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, the State makes an
irrevocable judgment about that person's value and place in society. This judgment
is not appropriate in light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender's capacity for change
and limited moral culpability." 98 And finally, Kennedy recognized, a youthful
prisoner's need for "hope" and "reconciliation with society," 99 insisting that states
provide them "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."100 Justice Kennedy grasped the reality of
American corrections. 101 And his juvenile sentencing decisions reflected that
understanding in their words and in their requirement that states offer the possibility
of redemption-even to minors who had committed the most serious crime.
These concepts and words are absent from Jones altogether. 0 2 For example,
Justice Kavanaugh uses the term "murderer" sixteen times in the Court's opinion. 103
Rather than referring to "youth convicted of murder" or even "defendants," the
Court's use of the term "murderer," reduces individuals like Brett Jones-whom we
know statistically have endured brutal childhoods-to the worst act they have ever
committed. Moreover, with respect to Jones's alternative argument - that sentencing
bodies make at least an implicit finding of "permanent incorrigibility"-the majority
rejects this as tantamount to a "magic-words requirement." 1 04 Magic is defined as
"the art of producing illusions by sleight of hand,"10 5 like a spell or a charm. Mr.
Jones wanted a court to determine that he was irredeemable before. sentencing
him to die in prison. The fact that the majority used such dismissive language in
response to that request reveals its disdain for the Miller trilogy itself. Finally, in
urging Mr. Jones to seek relief again in Mississippi, the Court notes, "[t]hose state
avenues for sentencing relief remain open to Jones, and they will remain open to
98

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).

9

Id. at 79.

10
Id. at 75; see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 213 (2016) ("[P]risoners like
Montgomery must be given the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption;
and, if it did not, their hope for some years of life outside prison walls must be restored.").

10! See, e.g., Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the Amer. Bar Assoc. Annual Mtg. (2003)
(addressing
failures
of
American
criminal
justice),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html
[https://perma.cc/7TGY-

79BG].
102 Language matters when speaking of crime and its consequences, and the criminal justice
world is slowly coming to this realization. Even journalistic practices are adjusting accordingly. See,
e.g., Akiba Solomon, What Words We Use - and Avoid - When Covering People and Incarceration,
THE MARSHALL PROJECT, April 12, 2021, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2021/04/12/whatwords-we-use-and-avoid-when-covering-people-and-incarceration# [https://perma.cc/E7CU-X7DG].

103 Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 passim.

104 Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1321; see also id. at 1331 ("Miller certainly does not require sentencers
to invoke any magic words.").
105 Merriam-Webster
Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/magic
[https://perma.cc/5S57-EHZK].
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him for years to come." 106 It is not clear what value the latter clause of that sentence
adds to the Court's opinion, but there is a haunting quality to it given the
extraordinary length of Jones's sentence and given the slim chances of his actually
07
obtaining relief in any of those state venues.' In short, the language of the Jones
majority is aloof and tone deaf-a far cry from the Miller trilogy's recognition of
inherent human dignity. 108
Despite its claims of judicial modesty, the Jones majority insulted the principle
of stare decisis, refused to acknowledge the stark realities of our broken criminal
justice system, and exchanged Eight Amendment language of dignity for
109
In the final Part
callousness. In these ways, the Court has damaged its legitimacy.
of this Essay, I consider ways in which advocates might pursue sustained reform for
justice-involved youth notwithstanding the disappointing reality of Jones.
III. JUVENILE SENTENCING REFORM POST-JONES
As discussed in Part II, the Jones Court turned its back on its own precedent,
ceding institutional credibility and moral authority in the process. But all is not lost
for the juvenile justice community. Indeed, "Jones should know that, despite the
1 0
And that is true for other justiceCourt's decision... what he does in life matters."
involved youth: their efforts matter, and their hopes of rehabilitation and rejoining
society should not be forsaken. In this final Part of the Essay, I map out possible
avenues for continued reform post-Jones.
First, the Court's determination that children are "constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of sentencing""' set in motion significant state legislative
changes in the last fifteen years. Because of the Miller trilogy, today twenty-five
states and D.C. ban JLWOP, while another six states have no one serving that
sentence." 2 In recent years, several states have amended the age of jurisdiction for
106 Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1323.
of
107 See Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1340 n. 10 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Having deprived Jones
his constitutional right, the Court gestures at a potential lifeline from other institutions, including the
Mississippi Legislature or Governor. But "the remote possibility" of such action "does not mitigate the
harshness of the sentence" that Jones now faces. The Eighth Amendment guarantees juvenile offenders

like Jones a basic constitutional protection against disproportionate punishments. The Court should not
leave the vindication of such important legal rights to others, or to chance.") (citations omitted).

108 See generally Meghan Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the Backdrop of the
Eighth Amendment, 2016 UNIV. ILL. L. REv. 2129 (2016).
109 There are many other ways in which the Court's legitimacy has been tested in recent years.
See Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court's Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARv. L. REv. 2240 (2019)

(book review).
10 See Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1341 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
"1 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012).
112 States that Ban Life Without Parole, CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR
https://cfsy.org/states-that-ban-1ife-without-parole-lwop-sentences-for-children/
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juvenile court either by raising the default age at which youth can be treated as adults
or by expanding the jurisdictional reach of juvenile court.1 3 States have also
implemented new laws regarding juvenile parole and transfer to adult court. 1 4
Perhaps most important, hundreds of individuals who were once told as minors that
they would die in custody have returned to their families and communities with great
success.'

5

Moreover, there is good reason to think state legislatures will continue to be
engines of change despite Jones. Juvenile advocates have leveraged the Miller
trilogy to educate voters and lawmakers about the inefficacy and inhumanity of
treating youth as if they were adults. Public sentiment is strongly in favor ofjuvenile
rehabilitation and alternatives to incarceration for many justice-involved youth.'16
At the same time, advocates now have not just case law and science to cite, but also
empirical evidence demonstrating that most youth can be rehabilitated and
successfully rejoin society. Consider Pennsylvania, for example. At the time of
Miller, Pennsylvania had more prisoners serving JLWOP than any other state in the
nation."' Today, more than two hundred of those individuals have come home; six
of those people have faced new charges; and only one has been convicted of a new
crime. 1 8 This recidivism rate of approximately three percent proves what advocates
have been urging for decades: the super majority ofjuveniles who commit crime age

113 See generally JUSTICE POLICY INST., RAISE THE AGE: SHIFTING TO A SAFER AND MORE
EFFECTIVE
JUVENILE
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
(2017),
https://justicepolicy.org/wp-

content/uploads/2021/06/raisetheage.fullreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA2B-XPG8]; see also Katie
Dodds, Why All States Should Embrace Vermont's Raise the Age Initiative,COALITION FOR JUV. JUST.
(July 22, 2020), https://www.juvjustice.org/blog/1 174 [https://perna.cc/AX26-K94F].

See, e.g., Maureen Washburn, California'sLatest Adult Transfer Law Models Pathwaysfor
Reform for Rest of U.S., JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCH. (Oct. 3, 2018), https://jjie.org/2018/10/03/californias114
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[https://perma.cc/BL84-JRGZ];

Daniel Nichanian, Virginia Makes All Children Eligiblefor Parole, A Major Shift for This Punitive
State, THE APPEAL (Feb. 24, 2020), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/virginia-and-minors-eligiblefor-parole/ [https://perma.cc/836F-QAF6].
"5
CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENT'G OF YOUTH, TIPPING POrNT: A MAJORITY OF STATES ABANDON
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 6 (2018), https://www.fairsentencingofyouth.org/

wp-content/uploads/Tipping-Point.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/H878-MVG3].
116
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(2014), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/08/psppjuvenilepollweb.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EMB5-AAAL]; GBAO, New Connecticut Poll Results on Youth
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Reform (March 29, 2021), https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/600i c98f39fd I e2dbc6708c4/t/6061 b
96a3053a21 d267c6aa1 /161701719489 1/Youth+First+Connecticut+Poll+Memo+March+2021+Final.
pdf?utm_source=The+Narrative+Project&utmcampaign=ea247b602f
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2019)
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'

9
out of criminal behavior and can be productive members of society."
Similarly, in 2016, D.C. enacted sentencing reform that initially permitted those
who had committed a violent crime before the age of 18 and who had served 15
years to seek release. 2 0 In 2021, the D.C. Council expanded this measure, permitting
2
those who had committed their crime before the age of twenty-five to seek release.
The bill's expansion was based, in part, on the fact that the first group of individuals
22
Most recently, in
released had reentered society with such tremendous success.
Maryland, lawmakers abolished JLWOP, overriding a gubernatorial veto.1 23 In sum,
voters and lawmakers have absorbed the fact that youth can be rehabilitated, and the
disappointing ruling in Jones cannot undo that fact.
Second, turning to courts, youth advocates should follow Justice Sotomayor's
lead and "hold [the Supreme] Court to its word: Miller and Montgomery are still
good law."1 24 This means that counsel for youth facing LWOP should insist that
there is a substantive bar on that sentence for all but the rarest of juvenile defendants.
Moreover, in defending youth against this extreme sentence, counsel should also
2
leverage the language of the Jones majority regarding the importance of counsel.'1
To the extent that the majority sees counsel as the sole shield between a youthful
defendant and the extraordinary sentence of LWOP, counsel should demand that the
right to counsel be robust in these cases. This means that representation standards
must comport with existing best practices for JLWOP cases and with constitutional
rights regarding expert assistance.1 2 6 In this way, states that persist in seeking
JLWOP sentences will be required to internalize the full financial, if not human,
costs of doing so. At the same time, in state courts friendly to the Miller trilogy,
litigants can continue to push for its full enforcement and logical extension. Miller

19

Id.
120 D.C. Code § 24-403.03; see also Eliana Block, D.C. Council is ConsideringLetting More
Violent Offenders Out Early (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.wusa9.com/article/news/d-council-isconsidering-1etting-violent-offenders-out-early-the-us-attoreys-office-says-thats-a-horible-idea/65-
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legislation prior to its expansion).
121 D.C. Code § 24-403.03.
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124 Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1337 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
125 See supra Part II.
126 See supra Part 11; see also Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1787,
1810-15 (discussing constitutional rights to counsel and expert assistance in JLWOP cases).
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is a floor for the states, not a ceiling,12 7 and wherever possible, youth advocates
should attempt to fully implement the principle that children are "constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing."12 8
Finally, while criminal justice reform historically has been more difficult to
achieve in the executive branch,1 29 it is worth considering which governors and other
executive actors may be amenable to juvenile sentencing reform post-Jones.
Sometimes reform can happen in unlikely places.13 0 A Mississippi prosecutor
recently urged Governor Reeves to exercise clemency and to release rehabilitated
prisoners as one way in which to address the state's ongoing prison crisis.1 3 1
Recognizing the need to insulate the governor from the political risks of clemency
and the rigidity of parole procedures, he further suggested a committee that would
identify people appropriate for clemency grants. 3 2 These are the kind of executive
actors with whom youth advocates can partner. This is a district attorney who is
aware of the need for criminal justice reform and receptive to the concept of
clemency. With additional expertise and resources from the juvenile justice
community, this kind of executive actor might be able to make headway in a state
where prospects seem otherwise bleak.
Now, in some pockets of America, the chances for this kind of sustained reform
will be slim, especially post-Jones. For Brett Jones, himself, who now must wait an
additional twenty-nine years before seeking compassionate release under state
law, 3 these suggestions may offer little comfort. However, youth advocates,
including this author, will continue to seek an end to juvenile life without parole "for
years to come." 3 4 And just as the death penalty has been eradicated in previously
127 Jonesv. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1309 (2021) ("our holding today does not preclude the
States from imposing additional sentencing limits").

128 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Trilogy
and the Persistenceof Extreme Juvenile Sentences, 58 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1659 (2021) (arguing for the
abolition of automatic transfer provisions and mandatory minimums as applied to youth per Miller).
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130 See, e.g., Desmond Meade & Neil Volz, Clemency Reform
is a Win-Win-Win for Florida,
SUN-SENTINEL (March 11, 2021), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/commentary/fl-op-comclemency-reform-desmond-meade-felons-rights-20210311-ywjnixm24valdlbp74yyiktese-story.html/
[https://perma.cc/VEY3-VH7E].
'3' Scott Colom, Granting Clemency One Solution to Mississippi Prison Crisis, JACKSON FREE
PRESS (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2020/jan/29/opinion-grantingclemency-one-solution-mississippi/ [https://perma.cc/3BE3-ASHX].
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2021), https://www.djournal.com/news/crime-law-enforcement/u-s-supreme-court-denies-brett-jones-
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aggressive capital states, so too can JLWOP be defeated one case at a time "by

attrition."135
CONCLUSION
13 6
over
As I have argued in this Essay, while the Jones decision is "abhorrent,"
to
it
is
than
reputation
institutional
Court's
the
to
blow
time it may be a bigger
case
of
years
fifteen
on
back
its
juvenile advocacy efforts. The Jones Court turned
law that insisted youth are categorically different and "cannot with reliability be
37
classified among the worst offenders."' At the same time, it revealed itself to be
out of touch with the dysfunction of American criminal justice and with the plight
of minors facing JLWOP. Given the juvenile justice reform momentum established
over the last decade, juvenile advocates can remain optimistic about state level
reforms, but what can one expect of the Supreme Court on this front in the years to
come?
By way of conclusion, I want to flag one avenue for challenging extreme
juvenile sentences that the Jones Court itself raised in dicta and query its viability.
Specifically, Justice Kavanaugh noted that "this case does not properly presentand thus we do not consider-any as-applied Eighth Amendment claim of
38
disproportionality regarding Jones's sentence."1 This statement is consistent with
Chief Justice Roberts's concurring opinion in Graham v. Floridain which he agreed
that Graham's sentence of JLWOP was disproportionate to his crime, but arrived at
the conclusion using an as-applied analysis rather than the majority's categorical
approach.1 39 Is the Jones majority signaling that the Court is now receptive to as40
applied challenges to extreme juvenile sentences under Harmelin? This would
come as a surprise to most defense counsel, who know that such challenges are rarely
successful. As Chief Justice Roberts himself explained in his Graham concurrence:
"This 'narrow proportionality principle' does not grant judges blanket authority to
second-guess decisions made by legislatures or sentencing courts. On the contrary,
a reviewing court will only "rarely" need "to engage in extended analysis to
determine that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate," and "successful
41
challenges" to noncapital sentences will be all the more "exceedingly rare."
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However, perhaps by resurrecting the argument that Roberts made in Grahamnearly
a decade ago and by including this point in the majority opinion-a majority joined
by the Chief Justice-the Court is indeed demonstrating receptivity to expanding its
view of these as-applied challenges. If so, one could imagine a fairly robust Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence from this Court even though it has quietly buried the
14
Miller trilogy.2

14

See William W. Berry III, Evolving Standards, As Applied, Working Draft, Summer 202
1(on

file with author) (discussing a possible approach for the Court to employ with as-applied challenges in
JLWOP context and breadth of potential application).

